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United States - Canadian Insolvencies: Reviewing Conflicting Legal Mechanisms,
Challenges and Opportunities for Cross-Border Cooperation
By: Edward T. Canuel*

The economies of Canada and the United States are strongly linked in a
relationship of mutual dependence. As of 2003, the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") trade alliance produced more than $11 trillion worth of goods
and services.' In 1999, Canada bought more U.S. goods than all 15 countries of the
European Union combined. 2 From 1985-2000, U.S. merchandise exports to Canada
tripled, with Canada being the lead foreign export market for U.S. goods since 1946. 3 "In
2000, the United States sold $179 billion worth of goods to Canada [and] bought $234
billion worth of Canadian goods. ' 4 The creation of NAFTA established North America
as the world's largest free trade block, which now contains approximately 400 million
people, second only to the European Union. Recent statistics demonstrated that in 2003,5
total imports and exports between Canada and the United States totaled $394 billion.
Each of these statistics demonstrates the enormous economic bonds between Canada and
the United States.
Despite the clear mutual economic reliance and strongly linked economies, and
the sienificant negative economic implications of international liquidations, both
countries have not created a formalized, cohesive system for contending with crossborder insolvencies. Part I of this paper analyzes and contrasts existing insolvency
mechanisms in the United States and Canada, focusing upon the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") and its differences (and similarities) with Chapter II of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code" or "Bankruptcy Code"). Additionally. the paper
reviews the concept (and effectiveness) of insolvency protocols, with discussion of the
judicial recognition of cross-border insolvency orders. the CCAA's concepts of
"fairness" and "reasonableness" and the guiding principles of comity, universality and
Part 11 analyzes the insolvency of Olympia & York Developments,
territoriality.
demonstrating the great financial impacts of cross-border insolvencies, the need for
* The author is a graduate of Boston College, Boston College Law School and Osgoode Hall School
of Law, where he received his LLM in Business Law. His practice areas include all aspects of
commercial real estate, corporate finance, and complex cross-border transactions (including
corporate immigration matters). Formerly with the international law firm of McDermott. Will &
Emery. Mr. Canuel is now a diplomat with the U.S. Foreign Service.
1U.S. Embassy in Mexico. North American Free Trade Agreement Tenth Anniversarn, at
htp://www.usembassv-mexico.gov/eNAFTA figures.htm (last visited Oct. 4. 2004). Unless
otherwise specified. all references to dollars in this paper are assumed in U.S. funds.
2 Canadian Embassy in Washington D.C.. United States-Canada:The World's Lrgest Trading

Relationship. at http:/www.canadianembassy.or2/trade/wltr2001 -en.asp (last visited Oct. 4. 2004).
3
4

Id.
Id.

5 U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics-U.S. Trade with Canadain 2003. at

hnp:///www.census.gov/foreien-trade/sitcl/2003/cl220.html (last visited Oct. 4. 2004).
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creativity from both the judiciary and practitioners and the spirit of cooperation between
the U.S. and Canadian legal systems. The Olympia and York line of cases serves as a
model to demonstrate how an insolvency is treated under Chapter II and the CCAA
insolvency regimes through the development of a protocol (particularly in the context of
real estate developer insolvencies) and how cooperation fostered through protocols
encourages innovations, flexibility and speedy resolutions. Part Ill reviews the guidance
available to courts in developing protocols, including the International Bar Association
Concordat, the American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project and the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")'s Model Act. In
addition to discussing the Canadian judiciary's review of jurisdiction and choice of law
issues in recent cross-border cases (and, in particular, the recognition of foreign
judgments), the paper concludes by analyzing the sustainability of cross-border
insolvency cooperation between Canada and the United States, considering the economic
implications of cross-border insolvencies and the challenges facing such judicial
cooperation.
1. The CCAA and the Advent of Protocols
The CCAA was enacted in 1934 to allow corporate reorganizations during the
global economic depression of the 1930's. 6 The CCAA fulfilled gaps in Canada's
Bankruptcy Act when corporate liquidations resulted from corporate insolvencies, 7 as
"large Canadian corporations found that their outstanding bonds had no contractual
provisions for amending their terms in times of financial difficulties." 8 The CCAA
addressed this issue, allowing corporations to restructure their debt. In response to
concerns that the CCAA was being abused, a 1953 amendment restricted its use so that
the debtor corporation must both hold an outstanding issue of bonds and have a trustee to
represent the interest of the bondholders. 9 With these requirements. the CCAA then fell
out of favor as an insolvency vehicle for about thirty years." ' The CCAA was then
resurrected to respond to the enormous restructuring needs of corporations during the
Canadian recession of the late 1980's and early 1990's. For example, between 1980 and
1995. the number of Canadian business bankruptcies increased from 6,595 to 13,258. "
In addition, "[d]uring the first nine months in 1990, there were 37,000 bankruptcies
(consumer and business) in Canada. up 37% from 1989... [with] CAN $2.2 billion in
6 Jacob S. Ziegel, The Modernization of Canada'sBankruptc-v Law in a Comparative Context. 33
TEX. INT'L L.J. 1.5-6 (1998) (hereinafter. "Modernization"). Conanies' Creditors Arrangement
Act. R.S.C.. ch. C-36. Sect. 18.6 (2004) (hereinafter. "CCAA ").
7 Sean Dargan, The Emergence oJ Mechanisms for Cross-Border Insolvencies in Canadian Law, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 107. 111 (2001). The Bankruptcy Act. amended in 1992 and now known as the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") is viewed as a means for small and medium-sized business
debtors who cannot meet the CAN $5 million threshold required by the CCAA. See Modernization.
supra note 6. at 9. See also Bankruptcy and hlsolvencv Act. R.S.C.. ch. B-3. Sect. 269 (2004). The
BIA (which is written in great detail, as compared to the sparsely worded CCAA) does not recognize
many aspects of Chapter 11, most notably that the filer need not make a showing of insolvency for
admission to bankruptcy.
8 Dargan. supra note 7. at 111.
9See Modernization. supura note 6. at 6.
5

See id.

See id. at 5 n.38.
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liabilities... left behind by 8,200 companies."

2

The Bankruptcy Act's inflexibility with

respect to corporate insolvencies caused a resurgence of interest in the CCAA.
Recognizing the implications of this Canadian recession, courts adapted the CCAA as a
"Canadian equivalent" to Chapter I I of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 13 to rescue financially
troubled corporations through: (i) allowing "instant" bonds and trust deeds to be created,
(ii) broadly interpreting Section 11 of the CCAA to allow courts sole discretion to issue
stays or orders restraining secured and unsecured creditors and (iii) recognizing an
implied power in the CCAA to implement by any means Parliament's "intention to create
a rescue culture" for distressed companies. 14
Courts are "given great discretion in handling CCAA proceedings, ' ' 15 as most
clearly evidenced by the court's authority to originate stay orders to allow a reorganizing
business to continue operating while a plan of reorganization is worked out. 16 If an
insolvent debtor reaches the CCAA filing threshold of CAN $5 million in outstanding
claims, "the company may commence a CCAA proceeding in the province of its chief
place of business or.,.in any province where the debtor has assets."' 17 Proceedings
commence usually with a court application, normally without notice or limited notice to
creditors,' 8 while the court must be satisfied that effective measures have been taken to
protect creditors.' 9 Several factors are considered by a court when reviewing a CCAA
application, including: (i) the "causes of the debtor's financial problems," (ii) "existence
of a coherent plan," (iii) available sources of funding, (iv) "the ability and readiness of
principals to provide substantial support for restructuring," (v) the "competence of
existing management or prospect for new competent management," 2(vi) the "confidence
in management" and (vii) the "impact on restructuring on employees. 0

12See Michael Crawford, "War Zone" of Bankruptcy Battles is Getting Bigger and More Profitable.

The Financial Post. Dec. 13, 1990, at 18, cited in Dargan , supra note 7. at I11.
13"The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598. 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) became effective
on November 6, 1978, and was codified principally in scattered sections of titles II and 28 of the
United States Code." most notably II U.S.C. Sections 101-1330 (1978). See Lawrence Ponoroff,
The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Questjor First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcyv
Code: Some Lessons from Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173 n. 1 (2000).
" See Modernization, supra note 6, at 7.
15Dargan. sipra note 7. at 112.
16See id. In Meridian Developmenrs v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1984] 52 C.B.R. 109 (Q.B.).

"Wachowich J.stated that the purpose of the stay power in s. I I of the CCAA was to maintain the
status quo, to give the debtor company breathing space to develop its restructuring plan, and to
prevent creditors from trying to obtain an advantage over other creditors." See Douglas S.
Nishimura. The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Petroleuin hidLtstr,: The Blue
Range Resource Corporation Proceedings, 39 ALTA. L. REV. 35, 43 (2001).
17See Dargan. sipra note 7. at 113.
18Bernard R. Wilson, The Creditors' and Debtors: Guide to Survival and Success. 28 C.B.R. (3d) 25
(2001).
19Id.
20 See id. See also Chris W. Besant.. International insolvencies - Aniendinents to the Bankrttptcv

and Insolvency Act. Insolvency Institute of Canada Art. (1995). [Note: Page numbers unavailable in
Quicklaw]
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The "stay" and plan of arrangement must follow the broad requirements under
the CCAA, which allows a considerable amount of judicial discretion. 21 Under the
CCAA, a judicially imposed stay 2 2 does not require the agreement of all creditors to the
amendment of their contracts.2 3 "The initial stay of proceedings is effective for a period
of, typically, 30 to 60 days... [which may] be extended... [if] the court is satisfied that
24
constructive negotiations are taking place between the corporation and its creditors."
"In addition, apart from the general stay, the court will normally prohibit suppliers and
other parties in contracts with the corporation from terminating their arrangements
without the court's permission." 25 "To be successful, a CCAA plan of arrangement must
be accepted by all of the classes of creditors to which the plan has been proposed and
additionally accepted by the court. ' '26 "Within classes of creditors, the plan must be
accepted by 50% of the voting creditors present, representing at least 75% of the claims
in that class." 27 While the plan is drafted, the court may appoint a "monitor" to oversee
the company's financial affairs and report upon any deterioration in such affairs during
the stay period.
The court need not sanction the plan even if it has been
approved by the required majority of creditors. It is a
purely discretionary exercise. and the court may find that
the plan is not economically feasible or is not in the best
interests of all the creditors. The court must be satisfied
that[: (i)] all statutory requirements have been complied
with[. (ii)] that there has not been any preference payments
or transfers of assets to creditors[, (iii)] that creditors have
been properly classified for voting purposes and [(iv)] that
voting procedures were properly followed. 2
"The stay over secured creditors was not available under the old Bankruptcy Act
and the CCAA therefore allows more "elbow room" for restructuring." 29 The lack of
comprehensive rules and judicial flexibility, as evidenced by the court's broad power to
issue stays and review plans, are thus viewed by many as the advantages of the CCAA.
rewarding creativity,
particularly as the CCAA does not define the conditions of the plan
31
of arrangement. ,
21See Wilson, supra note 18.
2 Ultimately. "[any party or shareholder who objects to the orders or decisions made under the
CCAA may apply for leave to appeal under Section 13. This right of appeal is not automatic." See
Nishimura. supra note 16. at 42.
23See Nishimura. sutqra note 16. at 37, citing to L.W. Houlden & G. Morawetz. The 1999 Annotated
BainkruItcy and lisolvenc "Act 924 (1998).
24See Besant, supra note 20.
25Id.
26

Id.

27Id. (Practitioners have argued that the manner by which creditors are divided into classes for

purposes of voting on plans of arrangement or compromises are too broad and thus inadequate.
Conversely, other practitioners view a lack of"hard and fast" rules regarding such class creation as a
positive feature, allowing broad flexibility in structuring successful organizations.)
21See Nishimura. .supra note 16 at 42.
29Wilson. swpra note 18.
3,CCAA. stupra note 6.
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The CCAA allows courts broad flexibility, as evidenced by the CCAA's
guiding principles of fairness and flexibility. In sanctioning a plan under the CCAA. the
court "weigh[s] the equities or balance[s] the relative degrees of prejudice that would
flow from granting or refusing the requested relief."' 31 Justice Blair has noted the need
for flexibility under the BIA and CCAA, stating that "Clearly. it would be undesirable for
the general working of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime... for some party to escape
the scrutiny (and if found wanting, the rectification) of a preference review merely
through a technical device."3 2 Similarly, Justice Blair held that a court reviewing a
CCAA matter must act reasonably, meaning that the court exercise "its discretion so that
justice would be done to all parties." 3 The expansive view of fairness, flexibility and
reasonableness is thus viewed by many practitioners as a key asset of the CCAA.34
"In 1997, Parliament's Bill C-5 added cross-border provisions to the BIA and
the CCAA, reflecting Parliament's willingness to address cross-border bankruptcies and
insolvencies. ' 35 "[T]he cross-border provisions had [arguably] already been read into the
CCAA by judges who approved [ad hoc solutions with U.S. courts, known as]
''
protocols."Y
For example, Section 18.6(2) of the CCAA confirms the concept of crossborder cooperation through protocols. giving courts the power to "make such orders and
grant such relief as it considers appropriate to facilitate, approve or implement
arrangements that will result in a co-ordination of proceedings under [the CCAA] with
any foreign proceeding." 3 7 Under Section 18.6(3) of the CCAA, these orders may be
made "on such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate in the

31See Re Olympia & York Developments. (1995) 34 C.B.R. 93. Justice Blair noted that a plan must
be "fair and reasonable." stating: "That the ultimate expression of the court's responsibility in
sanctioning a plan should find itself telescoped into those two words is not surprising. "Fairness"
and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and
workings of the [CCAA]. "Fairness" is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable
jurisdiction - although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the
judiciary by the legislation make its exercise an exercise in equity - and "reasonableness" is what
lends objectivity to the process.....If a debtor company, in financial difficulties, has a reasonable
chance of staving off a liquidator by negotiating a compromise arrangement with its creditors.
"fairness" to its creditors as a whole, and to its shareholders, prescribes that it should be allowed an
opportunity to do so. consistent with not "unfairly" or "unreasonably" depriving secured creditors of
their rights under their security. Negotiations should take place in an environment structured and
supervised by the court in a "fair" and balanced - or "reasonable" - manner. When the negotiations
have been completed and a plan of arrangement arrived at. and when the creditors have voted on it technical and procedural compliance with the Act aside - the plan should be sanctioned if it is "fair
and reasonable." See id. at 508-509.
32Id. at 10 1. (emphasis added).
q3ld.

-"See Leonard, Bruce and Justice J.M. Farley. "Insolvency Reorganization Practice and Procedure in
Canada" Lecture. Osgoode Hall Professional Development Centre Business LLM Program, February
10. 2004 (hereafter. the "Insolvency Lecture"). Although the lecturers noted flexibility was essential
to the CCAA's success. it was also suggested that the need to appoint (and maintain) an able
judiciary. well-versed in commercial law issues. was crucial to the CCAA's effectiveness.
35Dargan. stpra note 7, at 116.
-; Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald I. Silverman. Cross-Border Insolvec-vCooperation Protocols, 33
TEX. INT'L L.i. 587. 592 (1998) cited inDargan. supra note 7. at 116.
37CCAA. sujra note 6.
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circumstances." 38 Finally, the CCAA's Section 18.6(6) provides that the court may "seek
the aid and assistance of a court. tribunal or other authority in a foreign39 proceeding by
order or letter of request or otherwise as the court considers appropriate."
Despite many similarities, Chapter II and the CCAA have striking differences. Overall,
the CCAA has been identified as being "like Chapter 11. without rules. 41
Unlike the
CCA. the debtor's insolvency is not a precondition to a debtor's voluntary proceedings
under the Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, while Chapter II has
detailed procedures and rules applicable to all reorganizations, CCAA reorganizations
proceed in an arguably case-by-case fashion, with the rules created as the reorganization
proceeds. "Under the Bankruptcy Code, once a [Chapter] II petition is filed, [Section]
362 [of the Code] automatically... imposes a broad stay of proceedings against the
debtor." 4 1 Some commentators have also asserted that Canadian insolvency law
recognizes, with few exceptions, the inviolability of "freely negotiated" contractual
relationships between creditors and debtors, as compared to Chapter 11, which
encourages debtor rehabilitation by: (i) recognizing the interests of all stakeholders in an
insolvency (e.g. unsecured creditors, employees and equity holders) and (ii) having such
interests prevail over the contractual rights of secured creditors.42 Additionally, Section
304 of the Bankruptcy Code "readily grants ancillary proceedings. grants a stay, and
authorizes the turnover of assets to the foreign representative." 4 3 The Code also reasserts
local supremacy "through six factors that must be taken into account when exercising
the grant of ancillary powers."'' As comity is one such factor, Section 304 of the Code
can allow "full cooperation with foreign proceedings." 45 The "international perspective"
of Section 304(c) may be misleading for example, a foreign proceeding must result in a
distribution substantially in accordance with the Code.46 Finally, one of the most overt
differences between the U.S. and Canadian insolvency regimes is the lack of an
organized bankruptcy court in Canada. Although a U.S.- style bankruptcy court system
does not exist in Canada. the Toronto Superior Court has a "commercial list,"
representing an informal court division comprised of five or six judges versed in
commercial law who hear complex commercial and corporate litigation, including CCAA
proceedings

38Id.
3,Id.
'0See Insolvency Lecture, supira note 34.
41 See Jacob S. Ziegel. Corporate Groups and Canada-U.S. Crossborder hisolvencies: Contrasting
Judicial Visions. 35 Can. Bus. L. J.459. 462 (2001).
42YoINE GOLDSTEIN. et. al.. Olympia & York: Navigating Uncharted Waters. in CASE STUDIES IN
RECENT CANADIAN INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONSS 154 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1997).

4;See Besant. supra note 20.
44
d.

4 Id. The author details with specificity how U.S. courts have readily granted stays and transferred

rights to foreign representatives.
46

d.

47See Dargan. supra note 7. at 113. See also The Hon. Robert A. Blair. The Commercial List
-

Handling Business Cases Effectively. The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel. Inc.. May. 2001. at36.
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A. The Advent of Protocols: Universalism, Territoriality & Comity
Despite amendments to the CCAA, the needs of large insolvent corporations with cross48
Canadian and U.S. courts, recognizing that
border assets often remained unfulfilled.
49
"usually
void, provided solutions on a case-by-case basis, known as protocolS,
involving cases where debtors [simultaneously] file for protection under Chapter I I in
5
the United States and the CCAA in Canada." " As protocols have no prescribed format,
they are intended to address issues unique to each case. Protocols may be amended to
5
Additionally,
reflect changed conditions, at the approval of both courts involved."[plrotocols typically deal with co-ordination of: [(i)] court hearings in the two or more
jurisdictions, [(ii)] procedures dealing with the financing or sale of assets, [(iii)]
recoveries for the benefit or creditors generally and equality of treatment among the
general body of unsecured creditors, [(iv)] claims filing processes, and, ultimately, [(v)]
plans in different jurisdictions. ' ' 52 Protocols are "effective only upon their adoption and
approval by each of the [c]ourts involved in accordance with the local law and practice of
5 3
The trend of recent decisions
suggests that protocols are being
each local jurisdiction."
54
encouraged, by U.S. Courts.
not
if
accepted,
widely
Perhaps the greatest of debates regarding the use and recognition of protocols concerns
the tension between universality and territoriality principles. The "territoriality" principle
provides that insolvency proceedings (and the effects of such proceedings) are limited to
the state where the insolvency proceedings are opened.)' Critics of the territoriality

" Justice J.M. Farley. et. al. Cooperation and Coordination in Cross-Border Insolvencv Cases.,
University of British Columbia Faculty of Law: First Annual Insolvency Review Conference,
February 6. 2004. available at: www.airercol.org/imaees/coordination%20of%20crossborder%20insolvencies3.doc (last visited March 15. 2005). at 3. See also Dargan, sjopra note 7.
41 See Dargan. suipra note 7. at 119. citing Anne Nielson et al.. The Cross-Border hIsolvencv
Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of hiternationalhisolvencies. 70 Am. Bankr. L.
533, 557 (1996).
('See Dargan. supra note 7. at 120.
5 See Farley. supra note 48, at 9.
52d.
5

Id.

"[R]ecently. there has been authoritative United States appellate level recognition of the
importance of coordination of international insolvency proceedings. See Farley. supra note 48, at II.
For example, U.S. courts have explicitly noted the need for international cooperation. stating:
-'

"We strongly recommend, in a situation such as this, that an actual dialog
occur or be attempted between the courts of the different jurisdictions in an
effort to reach an agreement as to how to proceed or, at the very least, an
understanding as to the policy considerations underpinning salient aspects of
the foreign laws. ... Even if cooperation could not be achieved, it would be
valuable to communicate regarding the policies animating a certain law so as
to be better able to perform a choice-of-law analysis. While not required by
our case precedent or any principle of law, we urge that, in a situation such as
this, communication from one court to the other regarding cooperation or the
drafting of a protocol could be advantageous to the orderly administration of
justice." Farley. su ra note 48. at 11. citing to Stonington Partners v.
Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N. V.. 310 F. 3d 118 (3d. Cir. 2002).
55See Dargan. supra note 7, at 119: See also In Holt Cargo Systems htc. v. ABC Containerline N. V.
[2001] 30 C.B.R. (4"') 6. 14 (Adherence to the so-called "Grab Rule" in which each national court
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principle note the impracticability of its isolationist nature, given that, as global
economies internationalize, the need to encourage foreign investment becomes necessary.
Foreign investors, in turn, are concerned that they may seek discrimination in a court
adhering to territorial principles. Alternatively, "universality" theory holds that all assets
and claims must be administered in one single forum, out of interests of fairness and
equality among creditors. 6 A major criticism of universality is that nations are hesitant
to voluntarily surrender their territorial sovereignty and adopt an expansive universality
approach. For example. despite the legal, cultural and linguistic ties between the U.S.
and Canada, which share (with the exception of Quebec and Louisiana) a common law
tradition, a bankruptcy treaty has yet to be ratified between both countries.
The principle of comity is the "middle ground" between broad universalism
and isolated territoriality, which justifies the enactment of a protocol. For example, in
Maxwell Communication Corporation, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York and the English Court of Appeal, using the concept of comity as the
basis, created the first cross-border insolvency protocol.57 The Maxwell court noted that:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.

The principle of comity as a means to justify a protocol has been attacked recently in
Holt. In that case, Justice Binnie held that Canada follows a "plurality approach," "which
recognizes that different jurisdictions may have a legitimate and concurrent interest in the
conduct of an international bankruptcy, and that the interests asserted in Canadian courts
may, but not necessarily must, be subordinated... to a foreign bankruptcy regime.
The
59
general approach reflects a desire for coordination rather than subordination."
takes charge of assets in its own jurisdiction for the benefit of creditors who win the race to the
courthouse was held to be destructive of international order and effectiveness). The Holt court.
citing to Treco also stated that, under the territoriality principle. "the court in each jurisdiction where
the debtor has assets distributes the assets in that jurisdiction pursuant to local rules." In Re Treco.
240 F3d 148. 153 (U.S. C.A.2nd Cir. 2001).
"' See

Nielson. supra note 49, at 534. The Holt court, once again citing Treco. stated that under the
universality approach "aprimary insolvency is instituted in the debtor's domiciliary country, and
ancillary courts in other jurisdictions- typically injurisdictions where the debtor has assets - defer to
the foreign proceeding and in effect collaborate to facilitate the centralized liquidation of the
debtor's estate according to the rules of the debtor's home country." See Holt, supra note 55.

57Maxwell Commnication Corp. v.Barclays Bank. 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). aff d.

186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y 1995). aff'd. 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). citing to Hilton v. Guyot. 159
U.S. 113. 163-164 (1895).

58See id. at 816. See also R.v.Zingre. (1981) 2 S.C.R. 392. 401 (SCC) (Dickson. J.held that the
"Courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to he laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction.
not as a matter of obligation but out of mutual deference and respect.")
5'See Holt. sulpra note 55.
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The recent (and highly controversial) Holt opinion questions the Canadian
recognition of foreign judgments based upon principles of comity. In Holt. competing
claims were made to a ship by: (i) its bankruptcy trustee appointed in a Belgian
proceeding and (ii) American creditors asserting an in rein maritime lien. The Quebec
Superior Court (sitting in bankruptcy) recognized the Belgium bankruptcy order, subject
to the rights of any secured creditor under Canadian law. The Federal Court, which was
dealing with the maritime lien claim, refused to give effect to the Quebec court's orders
and refused to stay the lien proceedings. While the Supreme Court of Canada "ruled that
the Belgian bankruptcy was certainly not irrelevant to the Federal Court proceedings,
it... [would not] justify interfering with the Federal Court's maritime proceedings. ' . The
Supreme Court of Canada found that Canadian courts must "exercise their discretion to
stay or not to stay domestic proceedings according to all of the relevant facts and
considerations of a particular case."' Despite the recognition of comity, the Holt court
emphasized that Canadian bankruptcy court authority is derived from Canadian law. The
Court held that when Canada was called upon to lend assistance to foreign bankruptcy
courts, "Canadian law requires our courts to consider as one of the relevant circumstances
the juridical advantage which those disadvantaged by deferral to the foreign court would
enjoy in a Canadian court. 62 Justice Binnie "rejected the idea that 'international
coordination' necessitates the rubber stamping of orders made by the foreign bankruptcy
63
court."
Holt clearly expresses a view that comity cannot affect what a court considers
as a decision based in (and settled upon) Canadian law.
In a spirited criticism of the Court's decision, Justice Farley has questioned "why the
Belgian court's order was not entitled to respect and recognition."6 Justice Farley argued
that: (i) the facts supported the recognition of Belgian jurisdiction, as "[t]he debtor was
incorporated in Belgium, had its head office in Belgium and carried on business
there .... [(ii)] Belgian bankruptcy law [was not] misguided [or] oppressive [so] that it
would be against Canadian public policy to recognize Belgian bankruptcy proceedings in
Canada... [and (iii)] a Canadian court would have fully expected a foreign court to
recognize a Canadian bankruptcy order issued 65with respect to a Canadian debtor
incorporated and carrying on business in Canada."
The recognition by Canadian courts of cross-border insolvency orders under
principles of comity has prompted significant debate and study. For example, Canadian
courts have been criticized for recognizing "[C]hapter II proceedings initiated in the
United States against a Canadian affiliate as part of a corporate group filing in the United
States where the Canadian affiliate: [(i)] ha[d] not been found insolvent in Canada, [(ii)]
was incorporated under Canadian law, and [(iii)] ha[d] its principle operations in
Canada."66 Additionally, the logic of enforcing a stay of proceedings issued by a U.S.
bankruptcy court in Canada against a Canadian based non-debtor affiliate has been

60See Farley, supra note 48, at 24.
6' Holt Cargo Systenis. Inc. v. ABC Containerline N. V (Trustees of). [2001] 207 D.L.R. (4 11)
577.

608.
62 Id. at 594. (emphasis inoriginal).
61 Id. at 60 1.
64See Farley. supra note 48. at 24.
65Id. at 24-25.
6 See Ziegel, spra note 41. at 459.
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reviewed with skepticism. 6 7 In Singer, the Registrar of Bankruptcy refused to recognize
6
proceedings in New York against the Canadian subsidiary as part of a group filing. 1
Alternatively, in Babcockf 9 Justice Farley considered whether to extend recognition in
Ontario to a stay of proceedings order issued in Louisiana, which was issued in response
to Babcock & Wilcox ("BW") Canada's U.S. parent company and U.S. based affiliates.
The stay was sought (and granted) even though BW Canada, a Canadian incorporated
(and solvent) entity, was not party to U.S. proceedings, and not involved in any Canadian
bankruptcy proceedings. Justice Farley issued the requested stay order against potential
Canadian tort claimants and recognized the Chapter I I proceedings. He subsequently
defended his decision, stating:
"The stay in Babcock & Wilcox has now been in place for over three
years as the proceedings have evolved to an anticipated practical
resolution in the U.S. Interestingly. no affected Canadian creditor
has challenged, objected to or questioned the Canadian order in the
interim. It would seem that this lack of creditor involvement may be
taken as a form of practical approval by those concerned for a
common sense solution to a cross-border problem which maximized
the potential for value and minimized the difficulties and costs. The
decision in Re Babcock & Wilcox (Canada) hic. is perhaps the
clearest and most unambiguous statement to date of the extent to
which Canadian courts will cooperate with the courts of other
countries in cross-border and multinational reorganizations.'* 7

Opponents have attacked this proposition, questioning the logic of following a U.S. order
in the interests of comity while seemingly disregarding strong factual considerations
which questioned the appropriateness of following a foreign order against a domestic,
solvent entity. A Canadian company affected by a U.S. order was also reviewed in GS
Telecommunications bc.7 1 In that case. Chapter I I proceedings were recognized in the
United States by the parent company and its affiliates. The Canadian court issued "a
restraining order under the CCAA against proceedings against the group in Canada, [even
though] the parent company was incorporated and presumably had its chief executive
office in Canada. '7 2 Critics have questioned whether extending comity to broadly
recognize Chapter 11 proceedings ultimately adversely affects solvent Canadian
corporations (and the Canadian economy), while also jeopardizing the reputation,
relevance and appropriate recognition of Canadian law.

67See Singer Sewing Machine Co. of Canada. Ltd. (Re). 259 A.R. 364 (2000).
6

Justice Farley has questioned the Singer decision, citing that: i) the foreign representatives in

Singer had positive responses to requests from the United States Bankruptcy Court from over 100
countries (excluding Canada) and (ii) aside from Holt. no other recent examples exist of a Canadian
court refusing to cooperate or assist with a foreign administration. See Farley. sn pra note 44.
6,)
Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd (Re). 2000 O.T.C. LEXIS 2824 (2000).
70See Farley. sutpra note 48. at 22. Compare with Ziegel. supra note 41. at 460.
71In the maiter of GST Telecomoutications hic.. etal..
(May 18. 2000. Unreported. Ont.. S.C.J..
Docket File No. 00-CL3752. 2000 WL 1447410).
72See Ziegel. supra note 41, at 460-46 1.
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Justice Farley's decision in Babcock has prompted further discussion as to
whether courts should recognize proceedings based upon comity, at the peril of domestic
legal considerations. Comity and compliance with Section 18.6 of the CCAA apparently
guided the judgment in Babcock, although Justice Farley cited in that case several factors
to assist Canadian courts in responding to a foreign court's request for assistance,
including the location of the debtor's principle operations. undertakings, assets and
stakeholders and the substantive and procedural law to be applied so that undue prejudice
does not occur. 73 Critics viewed Justice Farley's decision as representing a "major
expansion of accepted comity doctrines." and that Section 18.6 of the CCAA was
included to "emphasize Canada's sovereignty.. .added at the urging of Canadian banks
who were concerned that U.S. bankruptcy courts might attempt to exert their long-arm
jurisdiction to reach Canadian based assets that were held by the banks as security for
loans extended in Canada." 74 Conversely, Justice Farley did not share the view that
Section 18.6 (2) required concurrent "foreign proceedings." 75 Babcock has raised
serious Canadian constitutional questions, including whether foreign legislation extends
to insolvent debtors if the debtor's insolvency is not a precondition of the foreign court's
jurisdiction, as is the case under Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code.
II: Olympia and York: Innovation through Necessity
The magnitude and complexity of the Olympia and York insolvency
precipitated the development, and re-examination, of measures dealing with U.S. Canadian cross-border insolvencies. The Olympia & York chain of cases serves as a
model of the divergent approaches and innovations under the CCAA and Chapter I I of
the Bankruptcy Code, and reveals the enormous value of cross-border cooperation.
Olympia and York Developments Ltd. ("OYD") was the parent of a family of companies
(collectively. "O&Y"), operating primarily in the U.S., Canada and the United Kingdom.
71, OYD held the three most prestigious office addresses in Toronto - First Canadian
Place, Scotia Plaza and Exchange Tower 77 _ as well as such premier sites as Esso Plaza
and Shell Center in Calgary, Alberta, the Esplanade Laurier and C. D. Howe buildings of
Ottawa, and the City Center Building of Edmonton. Alberta. 78 In addition, O&Y held
controlling interests in Gulf Resources Limited and Abitibi-Price Inc., and a majority in
the U.S. railroad conglomerate of Santa Fe Pacific Railroad. 76

71Id. at
71Id. at
75Id.

461.
469.

76 Paul

Reichmann and his family are trying once more to retain their Canary Wharf holdings.
staving off a buy-out bid from Brascan Corporation of Toronto, which owns 9 percent of Canary
Wharf. The project includes approximately 14 million square feet of office space valued in 2004 at
approximately $2.5 billion. See Heather Timmons. A Widening Tussle Over a London Office

Complex. N.Y. Times. November 13. 2003. at Wt.
77First Canadian Place Scotia Plaza and the Exchange Tower alone contained 5.3 million square feet
of rentable space and had combined debts ofS 1.3 billion. Clyde H. Farnsworth. Olyinpia May Yield
Real Estate, N.Y. Times. November 20, 1992. at DI.
78 Clyde H. Farnsworth. Olyimpia s Woes May Aid CanadianMarket. N.Y. Times. November
2 1.
1992. at 33.
7"See Goldstein. supra note 42. at 152.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

11

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

The U.S. portfolio of the Reichmann family was vast. as O&Y bought much of
the real estate portfolio of developers Percy and Harold Uris during a recession in 1977,
the first step in establishing itself as the largest commercial landlord in New York.8" As
evidence of its size, Olympia & York U.S.A. had about $5 billion in debt in 1995.s
At
its apex, Olympia & York U.S.A. held approximately "18 million square feet of space in
New York City anchored by the World Financial Center at Battery Park City in lower
Manhattan." 82 Olympia & York U.S.A. owned a number of other prime Manhattan
properties. such as 165 Broadway, 237 and 245 Park Avenue. 320 Park Avenue, 55
Water Street and 1290 Avenue of the Americas. Additionally, the U.S. concern held a
prime, undeveloped 9.02 acre site
in downtown Miami known as the Miami One Site,
83
assessed in 1998 at $29 million.
In addition to an over-expansion in inflationary times. O&Y's troubles stemmed
from an ambitious office development in London's Canary Wharf, which siphoned off $6
billion while yielding only minor returns. 84 Income streams were drying up from
investments, as evidenced by the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert, a principal
tenant of Olympia & York U.S.A.'s 39-story, million-square-foot office building located85
on 60 Broad Street in New York, which was encumbered by a $160 million mortgage.
O&Y's financial downfall was also credited to a decision from lenders to reduce a needed
financing by $150 million which required a security interest on O&Y's remaining
unencumbered Canadian real estate interests, effectively prohibiting future financings. 86
The privately held and secretly-run enterprise, which grew out of a Toronto tile company
in the late 1950's, held $20 billion in real estate
assets at its apex- in 1993, it owed $6.7
87
billion on its Canadian office towers alone.
The complex structure of O&Y wrecked havoc for creditors,88 and created
countless court proceedings. 89 In particular, the assets (and loan draw-downs) of the

8"Kenneth N. Gilpin, Developer and Creditor Bid for Olympia & York U.S.A.. NY. Times. July 14,

1995, at D2.
8 Id.

82Jeanne B. Pinder, Olyhpia's Creditors in U.S. Square Off"With Canadians. N.Y. Times, May 13.

1993. at .

83Lisa Baertlein. Prine Pieces in a Puzdle. Miami Daily Business Review. February 27. 1998, at S2.

84Clyde H. Farnsworth. Olyrpia & York Liquidation Plan Advances, N.Y. Times, January 26, 1993
at D6. See Olvmnpias Woes May Aid Canadian Market. N.Y. Times. supra note 78.
85Mervyn Rothstein. Commercial Real Estate; Dividing aii Office Tower to Get the Most From It.
N.Y. Times. April 7, 1999. at B8.
86See Goldstein. supra note 42. at 153.
87See Olympia & York Liquidation Plan Advances. supra note 84.
88Olympia's lenders in Canada and the United States were many of the world's leading financial
institutions, including Citicorp. Canadian Imperial Bank, Sanwa Bank, Nomura Ltd.. J. P. Morgan.

First National Bank of Chicago. the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and Credit Suisse of
Switzerland. Allen R. Myerson. Lenders Split On Backing O.& Y. Plan. N.Y. Times, October 29,
1992. at D4. see also Steven Prokesch. 3 Named toAdminister Olymipia London Project: U.S
Empire in Trouble. N.Y. Times. May 29, 1992. at All. Apollo Real Estate Investment Fund L.P.,
O&Y's largest single creditor, held more than $400 million face amount of its debt. See Gilpin.
supra note 80.
8,The recent O& YDevelopments v. O&YRealty. 28 C.B.R. 4"' 294. 306 (2001). which was heard
nearly a decade after the initial proceedings commenced, reviewed a series of complex asset
transfers among the 0 &Y companies. particularly involving assets of the U.S. affiliates. The case
involved creditors claiming that OYD was owed at best S39 million by its affiliate. Olympia & York
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revenues and loans for all of the O&Y companies were centralized to meet the
obligations of all the companies (with the exception of its U.S. real estate assets, operated
and managed in New York City by Olympia & York U.S.A.). The aggregate debt of the
twenty-nine O&Y group of applicants amounted to CAN $13.5 billion in 1992."'
Concurrent filings in the United States and Canada occurred, as the debtor sought (and
obtained) the benefit of Chapter I I's automatic stay, given the possibility existed that the
Canadian filing and request for stay would be contested. The concurrent and voluntary
proceedings were commenced under Chapter 11 for the five U.S. companies in May,
1992. 91 OYD owned approximately 80% of the five U.S. insolvency applicants (which
were all indirect owners of the U.S. assets). The resulting stay prevented U.S. creditors
from reaching the Canadian parent, while Canadian92creditors were barred from acquiring
immediate control of the U.S. restructuring process.
Courts immediately recognized the far-reaching implications of the insolvency,
while simultaneously confronted the conflicting provisions of the CCAA and Chapter 11.
Shortly after the filing of claims. Justice Blair of the Ontario Court of Justice issued an
expansive emergency order. 93 The order acknowledged the importance of cross-border
cooperation. with differences in the Canadian and U.S. legal systems demonstrating the
potential for widely-different. inconsistent and perhaps devastating results if judicial
cooperation could not occur. For example, Canadian law did not recognize the concepts
embedded in Section 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allowed the debtor to operate
its business during the reorganization period in a "normal" fashion. Specifically,
Sections 364(a)-(d), 503(b) and 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permitted, among other
things, the following: (i) that the debtor could receive unsecured credit in the ordinary
course of business without having received prior court approval, (ii) court authorization
for all administrative expenses through imposing a lien on unencumbered property or a
junior lien on estate property subject to a prior lien and (iii) upon the court's permission.
the debtor could obtain credit by granting a super priority lien or lien of equal rank with
existing liens on property of the estate provided that the existing security interests were
adequately protected.94 As evidence of the spirit of comity, companion orders were
commonplace during the O&Y insolvency, with the Ontario courts issuing more than
SF Holdings Corporation. but that OYD and its creditors took $611 million of that affiliate's assets
as security for OYD's indebtedness, both direct and through is guarantees.
" See Goldstein. supra note 42. at 15 1.
, Note that the parties did not attempt to seek recognition of the Canadian proceedings under
Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, under which, as noted previously, a "foreign
representative" may commence ancillary proceedings. as that provision requires appointment of a
monitor (which the Canadian applicants did not intend) and the existence of a trustee (which does
not exist under a CCAA filing). See Goldstein. supra note 42, at 156.
')?See id. at 155.
' The order held: (i) that O&Y retain possession of its properties and carry on business (to the extent
that no security of the lenders would be impaired): (ii) the applicants were not to make capital or
interest payments owing to lenders during the stay period: (iii) contemplated creditors' committees
to represent the various types of creditors. (iv) appointed an "information officer: empowered to gain
access to the financial records of the applicants and respond to reasonable requests from creditors
and (v) allowed the payment of trade creditors for amounts owed as of the date of the filing. See id.
at 157. Note that under Section 362(a) of the Code, the payment of pre-petition trade debt. unlike
Canadian law, was stayed as this Section provided for a stay in the collection, assessment or
recovery of any pre-petition trade debt.
' See Goldstein. sttpra note 42.
at 160.
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seventy orders. 95 Provisions were included in the orders seeking cross-border
recognitions. which were routinely followed. For example, O&Y was allowed, via
companion orders, to sell its interests in Santa Fe Pacific Corporation and Santa Fe
Energy Resources, Inc. for net proceeds in excess of $500 million.
Prior to the O&Y insolvency, conventional Canadian restructuring generally
required the involvement of a lender or group of lenders who would continue to fund the
necessary expenses for the restructuring. The cross-border implications of the O&Y
insolvency necessitated a reform of how such funding would occur. The hesitancy of
Canadian secured creditors to use the proceeds of a sale of inventory, collection of
receivables or cash flow from rental receipts for restructuring purposes if they were
encumbered with existing security interests created a crucial restructuring issue. O&Y
did not have a singular lender (which would have assisted such restructuring).
Additionally, further complicating matters. O&Y did have a centralized cash
management system, and therefore creditors who held security on specific assets were
denied the ability to segregate revenues to ensure that such rents would not be pooled to
pay the expenses for other buildings. 96 In order to address how general administrative
and restructuring ("GAR") costs would be paid, the courts decided to: (i) apply cash flow
from secured assets, such as rentals from real property and dividends from securities, to
cover the costs of managing the encumbered asset and to pay a management fee to cover
all GAR costs and (ii) approve the sale of unencumbered assets to generate further
revenues to fund GAR costs. As an additional innovation applied in subsequent real
estate insolvencies, the Canadian court imposed a security interest on the unencumbered
assets running in favor of the secured creditors who overfunded the GAR CoStS. 9 7 The
debtor companies were thus allowed to finance themselves during the court-supervised
restructuring process.
The concept of insolvency protocols was refined in the O&Y restructuring. For
example, the O&Y courts issued a protocol adopting a territorial theory of professional
engagement and fee determination which was crucial, as. unlike Chapter 11. the CCAA
broadly provided for the payment of professional fees. The Canadian and U.S. courts
compromised. as professionals rendering services in either Canada or the U.S. would be
bound by that country's professional rules; provided, however, that each court did not
surrender, or abandon, its jurisdiction in respect of professional engagements and the
payment of professional fees. "The U.S. Court relied on Section 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code to justify this cooperation, which provides that a Bankruptcy Court
may issue an order, process or judgment necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.' 98 "U.S. Courts have broadly determined that this
Section enables courts to do whatever is necessary to aid its jurisdiction, and that it has

'15
An example of intent to encourage judicial cooperation is evidenced by the following provision
contained inthe Ontario orders: "THIS COURT SEEKS AND REQUESTS the aid and recognition
of any Court or administrative body in any province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or
administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of
America to act in aid of and to complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of this Order."
Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd.. 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75.
9 See id.at 162-163.
See id.

'See Goldstein. supra note 42. at 166.
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authority to use its equitable powers to assure the orderly conduct of the reorganization
proceedings." 99
Finally, the Canadian court gave great reliance to the fairness of the
proceedings. Upon sanctioning the reorganization plan, Justice Blair noted that the plan
should be "fair and reasonable" stating that: .".Fairness'"" is the quintessential expression
of the court's equitable jurisdiction - although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad
discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation make its exercise an
exercise in equity - and 'reasonableness' is what lends objectivity to the process.""' In
addition, sanctioning the protocol for the corporate governance of O&Y's U.S. operations
and the Canadian parents of those operations based upon issues of comity and
cooperation, Justice Blair noted:
Insolvency disputes with international overtones and involving
property and assets in a multiplicity of jurisdictions are becoming
increasingly frequent. Often there are differences in legal concepts sometimes substantive, sometimes procedural between the
jurisdictions. The Courts of the various jurisdictions should seek to
co-operate amongst themselves, in my view, in facilitating the
transborder resolution of such disputes as a whole, where they can be
done in a fashion consistent with their own fundamental principles of
jurisprudence. The interests of international cooperation and comity.
and the interests of developing at least some degree of certitude in
international business and commerce, call for nothing less."MI
The concept of fairness, now a routine precept of CCAA orders, and approval of plans,
was reexamined and strengthened through the O&Y insolvencies.
O&Y's insolvency prompted a serious reconsideration of cross border
cooperation, specifically in the context of real estate developer insolvencies, which have
enormous economic implications. The import of O&Y's organized approach to
contending with such an insolvency is best evidenced by viewing several reorganizations
which occurred prior to the O&Y decisions. For example. a significant Canadian real
estate developer: the Campeau Corporation, restructured its assets in the 1980's following
huge losses suffered by its U.S. subsidiaries, the Federated Department Stores, Inc. and
Allied Store Corporation. ")2 At one point, Campeau's debt exceeded $10 billion. During
the 1990 insolvency proceedings, Campeau's successor in interest, Camdev, only
succeeded its financially troubled parent after extensive, lengthy and costly restructuring
proceedings. Another case of an insolvent developer which would have benefited from
the innovations of the O&Y cases was Northland Properties, a major western Canadian
developer which once owned nineteen hotels, several major office buildings and prime
See id. at 166.
'00 See id. at 176, citing to Olympia &York v. Royal Trust, (1993) 17 C.B.R. ( 3rd) I (Ont. Gen. Div.).
10' Olvnpia & York Developments v. Royal Trustco. (1993) 20 C.B.R. (3d) 165 at 167 (Ont. Gen.
'i

Div).
'02See Kevin McElcheran, The Resrtirutring of Campeau Corporation. in CASE STUDIES INRECENT
CANADIAN INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS 75. 75-76 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed.. 1997). See also
Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.. (1992) O.J. No. 1946.
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vacant land in Vancouver, Calgary, Oregon and California. At the height of its success,
Northland employed over 1.000 employees, and subsequently became indebted to over
2,100 creditors. In 1988, Northland claimed insolvency, following a period of interest
rates exceeding 20% and negative equity approaching CAN $100 million. Despite the
amicable relationship between the Canadian reviewing justice and opposing counsel
noted by one commentator, 1o3the cross-border implications of the case caused
considerable, costly restructuring delays. The lessons of O&Y evidence a cooperative
spirit and the realization that drawing out an insolvency would damage existing resources
and undermine the salvaging of any credible assets. The expansive O&Y framework of
cross-border cooperation allows a speedy, efficient reorganization to the insolvency of
real estate developers whose assets significantly affect the Canadian and U.S. economies.
III: The Concordat, Model Law and the American Law Institute Guidelines
In contending with U.S. and Canadian insolvencies, courts and practitioners
have significant guidance available in addressing the reorganizations and developing
protocols, including the International Bar Association Concordat. the American Law
Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project and United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)'s Model Act.
The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat"" (the "Concordat") provides
guidelines for cross-border insolvencies and reorganizations which the parties or the
courts could adopt as practical solutions, tailored to fit the particular circumstances. The
Concordat is based upon the universalist theory,' 5 as evidenced by Principle 4(A) of the
Concordat. which noted that if more than one plenary forum exists, "each forum should
'
coordinate with each other, subject in appropriate cases to a government protocol.
The Concordat is not intended to be used as. or as a substitute for, a treaty or statute, or a
rigid set of rules; rather. the Concordat is a practical interim measure until treaties and/or
statutes are adopted by commercial nations."' 7 Serving as a guide to practitioners in
harmonizing cross-border insolvencies, the Concordat could be implemented by court
orders or formal agreements between official representatives, or informal arrangements.
8
The
depending upon the rules and practices of the particular forum involved."
Concordat actually originated out of the common insolvency community conclusion that

103Ralph D. McRae. Northland Properties. in Case Studies in Recent Canadian Insolvency

Reorganizations 101 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed.. 1997).
10' The Concordat was formally adopted by the Council of the Section on Business Law of the
International Bar Association as its Twelfth Biennial Meeting in Paris in September 1995 and.
subsequently. by the full Council of the International Bar Association itself at its meeting in Madrid
in May, 1996. See Farley. sitpranote 48. at 6.
05See Nielson. supra note 49. at 534. It has been suggested that the Concordat provides a
framework for national, ancillary proceedings to counterbalance the universal proceedings offensive
to many Canadians and Americans. See Dargan. supra note 7. at 126.
106See Dargan. siipra note 7. ai 120. citing to David H. Culmer. Note: The Cross-Border hIsolvencv
Concordatand Ciiusoiar "hternationalLaw: Is ItRipe Yet?. 14 Conn. J. Int'l L. 563. 591 fn. 123
(1999) (quoting Principle 4 of the Concordat).
107See Introduction to the Committee J Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat. cited inFarley. siupra
note 48. at 42.
]ONId.
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cross-border insolvencies and reorganizations would rarely be dealt with effectively
through international treaties.' 9
The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies was approved by the
UNCITRAL in 1997, and, although not dealing with choice of law issues, focuses upon
the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and the protections of assets of foreign
estates.'"' The Model Law deals with: (i) access by the foreign representative to the local
insolvency courts, (ii) recognition of the status of the foreign representatives if the
prescribed prerequisites are met, (iii) assistance to the foreign representatives by granting
orders for the stay of proceedings against locally based assets of the foreign estate and
(iv) cooperation between the courts of the recognizing state and the foreign state."'1
The Model Law contemplates a high level of cooperation between courts in cross-border
cases. Under Article 26, domestic courts are directed to cooperate "to the maximum
extent possible" with foreign courts and foreign insolvency representatives. Article 25
provides that the courts may communicate directly with each other and request
information or assistance from the foreign court or from the foreign insolvency
representative. Cooperation under Article 27 of the Model Law may consist of
appointing someone to act on the direction of the court, communicating information by
any means considered appropriate by the court and co-coordinating the administration of
the debtor's assets and affairs in both jurisdictions. Finally, Article 30 provides that
courts may approve or implement agreements concerning the co-ordination of concurrent
proceedings involving the same debtor.
Several differences currently exist between the Model Law and the Canadian
insolvency principles found under Section 18.6 of the CCAA. For example, the Model
Law differentiates between foreign "main proceedings" (where the foreign representative
is entitled as of right to assistance of the domestic court) and foreign "non-main
proceedings" (where such assistance is discretionary)." 2 Additional provisions of the
Model Law which appear to either contradict the CCAA, or are in themselves
inconsistent or unclear, have raised concerns among practitioners and academics,
including: (i) the definition of "foreign proceeding" under the Model Law makes it
uncertain as to whether the foreign debtor must be insolvent, (ii) corporate group status
is not addressed, (iii) the stay of proceedings is limited to the proceedings against the
debtor or the debtor's property and (iv) the Model Law indirectly addresses the
implications arising when the court balances the interests of local creditors with the need
See Besant. supra note 20.
The UNCITRAL Model Law was being formulated at the time of Canada's 1997 amendments to
the CCAA and BIA. See Farley, supra note 48. at 9-10. Many of the significant concepts of the
Model Law are therefore present in the existing CCAA legislation. although not expressed in the
language of the Model Law. See id. at 9-10. see also lecture of Ronald Cuming. "Canadian
Commercial Law Influences Abroad." at Osgoode Hall Professional Development Centre Business
Law Program. March 31. 2004 (raising questions whether the Model Law will ever be adopted given
recent revisions to the BIA and CCAA): see also Ziegel, saira note 41. at 484 (noting that the
Model Law. despite its many comprehensive provisions, does not define the term "debtor").
" See Ziegel. stqira note 41. at 484.
"12 If the foreign proceeding is recognized as a main proceeding. the Model Law
provides for an
automatic stay of proceedings by creditors against the debtor's assets and the suspension of the right
to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of the debtor's assets. See Farley. supra note 48. at 12.
The scope and terms of the stay of proceedings are subject to the normal requirements of domestic
law. Id.
'o
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to promote cooperation with other insolvency jurisdictions." 3 Proponents of the Model
Law must recognize these inconsistencies, and prepare for potential conflicts (and court
challenges) in Canadian legal proceedings attacking differences between domestic law
and the Model Law's provisions.
The Model Law's proponents have warned against the insistence by parties to
international agreements that the interests of domestic creditors and investors prevail over
their foreign counterparts in any circumstances, as such a view evaporates the legitimacy
of international agreements.'1 4 In addition, the Model Law provides that foreign
proceedings can be modified if inconsistent with domestic proceedings. Commentators
point out that the Model Law therefore ensures the fair treatment of domestic creditors, as
its Article 29(b)(i) specifically provides that "if a domestic proceeding is commenced
after an application for recognition of the foreign proceeding, the domestic court must
review the relief sought by the foreign representative and must modify that relief if it is
inconsistent with the domestic proceedings." 115In the United States, the Model Law was
passed by both Houses of Congress but has not yet been enacted. In Canada. the Model
Law has been studied by the Senate Banking, Trade and Commerce Committee, with
adoption recommended with limited consideration.
One additional source of guidance for crafting protocols is the American Law
Institute ('ALI")'s Transnational Insolvency Project. assembled to harmonize insolvency
law in the three NAFTA members, the United States, Canada and Mexico." 6 Unlike the
Model Law, the ALl Project's Guidelines recognize the importance of corporate groups
in international insolvencies and single them out for separate discussion. Additionally,
the Guidelines, as opposed to the Model Law, find that "it should be permissible to file
bankruptcy for a subsidiary in the same jurisdiction as the parent's bankruptcy, and to
have either procedural or substantive consolidation under applicable law. absent a
proceeding involving the subsidiary in the country of its main interests." 17 The
Introduction to the Guidelines notes that they were "[l1ntended to enhance coordination
and harmonization of insolvency proceedings that involve more than one country through
communications among the jurisdictions involved."
Seventeen guidelines were
developed, with the goals of flexibility and achieving "efficient and just resolutions" to
be applied "only in a manner that is consistent with local procedures and local ethical
requirements.' 1 8
The Guidelines mandate that local domestic rules. practices and ethics must be
fully observed, while intending to enhance coordination and harmonization of insolvency
proceedings that involve more than one country through communications among the

See Ziegel. st pra note 41. at 489-491.
'14 See Farley. siqpra note 48. at 13.
115See id. at 15.
113

16See American Law Institute. Transnational Insolvency Project. Principles of Cooperation in
Transnational Insolvency Cases among the Members of the North American Free Trade Agreement

(Tentative Draft. April 14. 2000) cited inZiegel, siqpra note 41. at 462. The Guidelines Applicable
toCourt Comnutications inCross-Border Cases (the "'Guidelines")were reviewed by the reporters

and advisors in each of the three NAFTA countries and approved by the membership of the
American Law Institute at its Annual Meeting on May 16. 2000.
17

See Ziegel. sutpra note 41. at 493.
See Guidelines. htroduction.
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jurisdictions involved.' 9 Court communications, which permit rapid cooperation in a
developing insolvency case, are encouraged. as such speedy cooperation also ensures due
process.' 2"
The concept of court-to-court communications is viewed under the
Guidelines as a linking of two concurrent court hearings, all conducted in accordance
with proper systems and procedures. The only change from a purely domestic hearing is
the technological link to the other court.' 21 One major issue regarding the practicality of
the Guidelines is whether a party's participation in arguments or submissions being made
in a hearing in the other country constitutes an attornment to the jurisdiction of the other
court.-22 The Guidelines attempt to anticipate that difficulty by indicating that such
participation will not constitute an attornment to the jurisdiction of the other court unless
the party who participates in the hearing in the other court is actually seeking relief from
that court.' 23 This is consistent with Article 10 of the Model Law, which indicates that an
application by a foreign representative does not subject the foreign representative or the
foreign assets or the affairs of the debtor to
24 the jurisdiction of the domestic court for any
purpose other than the actual application.'
IV: Conclusion
A.

Foreign Judgments and Jurisdictional Matters

Canadian courts scrutinize choice of law and general jurisdictional issues
(particularly with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments) in the context of
cross-border insolvencies, analyzing which court has the sufficient connections to hear
the aspect of the insolvency by weighing factual considerations of the case and ultimately
considering the implications of international comity. 125 For example, in Olympia & York
Ltd., 126the bankruptcy administrator moved for authorization that the Canadian affiliates
of OYD involved in the U.S. Chapter I I proceedings pay for management fees, services
and expenses paid for by OYD in efforts related to the U.S. restructuring process. The
Canadian affiliates opposed the motion, stating that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, where
proceedings were pending under the Bankruptcy Code. had jurisdiction. The court
1,,

Farley. supra note 48, at 30.

120See id.
121Id.

122ld at 31.
123Id.
124Id.

125Many commentators have discussed the specific need to ascertain where an insolvency must be
filed to ensure its effective review. For example. ajudicial theorist has proposed that in the absence
of effective treaty or convention arrangements. the choice in a multinational or cross-border
insolvency or reorganization reflects either a primary/secondary jurisdiction structure or a
concurrent/parallel proceedings structure. See Farley. siupru note 48. at 3. In concept, a
primary/secondary jurisdiction model would involve a filing in the primary jurisdiction where the
debtor's central operations are located and subsequent secondary filings in jurisdictions where other
assets are located. Id. In the concurrent/parallel jurisdiction model, the reorganizing business would
file full proceedings in both the jurisdiction where its central operations are located and in other
jurisdictions where key assets are located. Id. Finally, a genuine primary/secondary model, the
secondary jurisdiction would defer in major respects to the primary jurisdiction. (perhaps) to the
point of turning over assets for administration in the primary jurisdiction. Id.
126Olympia & York Ltd.. (1996) 43 C.B.R. (3d) I 11. 117.
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reviewed the principle of forun non conveniens, which analyzes whether there is another
forum that is clearly more appropriate for the adjudication questioned (and thus displaces
the chosen forum), and whether injustice would occur if a stay was imposed. 27 The
court considered that "real and substantial factual connections" lied with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court and not the Canadian courts. The factual considerations included: (i)
the buildings and real estate all lied in the United States, (ii) the ownership chain
involved U.S. limited partnerships and corporations and (iii) the majority of valuation
witnesses regarding the U.S. restructuring were in New York.t 28 Justice Blair further
held that:
"A CCAA proceeding, by its very nature - particularly in complex
multi-national insolvency situations involving assets in various
jurisdictions - is a veritable Pandora's Box of matters which, in
themselves, would amount to substantial actions or applications.
They find their way under the rubric of the CCAA umbrella because
of the all-embracing reach of the proceedings in relation to the
activities of the debtor company."' 29
Justice Blair has stated that "In the context of multi-jurisdictional insolvencies the courts
of different jurisdictions should strive - to the extent they can within the parameters of
their own fundamental precepts of justice - to ensure that matters are adjudicated in the
proper forum with the closest connection to the subject matter. Principles of international
comity, included in those incorporated in the forum non conveniens test, provide the
touchstones to assist them in doing so."' 3 ' The "closest connection" thus incorporates
principles of comity in addition to the unique factual considerations of each case.
Although the principles of international comity are reviewed in determining the
proper judicial forum, Canadian courts will also strongly consider whether forum
shopping has occurred. 31 The Canadian courts have also carefully construed forum
selection clauses in contracts, while also reviewing the totality of factual connections to
Canada or an outside jurisdiction, particularly in considering whether to recognize a
foreign judgment. 32 In the recent controversial case of Beals, 133 the Supreme Court of
127Id. at 115.

12 Id. at 116-117.
29
1 Id. at 117.
130Id. at 118.
"' In Holt, the court held that a natural forum is the one to which the action has the most real and
substantial connection. Relevant circumstances not only include public policy issues, but also the

potential loss to the plaintiff of ajuridical advantage sufficient to work an injustice if the
proceedings were stayed. the place or places where they carry on their business, the convenience and
expense of litigating in one forum or another, and the discouragement of forum shopping. The Court

held that "Inshort, within the overall framework of public policy, any injustice to the plaintiff in
having its action stayed must be weighed against any injustice to the defendant if the action is
allowed to proceed. What is required is that these factors be carefully weighed in the balance."
Holt. suprajn. 55. at 36.
132The extent to which parties to debt actions have recourse to chose their own laws is demonstrated
in CanadianRed Cross Socien. (2002) 35 C.B.R. (4 t ' ) 43. 46. holding that a plan of compromise
and arrangement is a contract. sanctioned by the court. and thus subject to principles of contractual
interpretation. In that case, the plan retroactively applied a contractual provision that Ontario law
applied to all Canada-wide claims related to HIV blood treatments.
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Canada held that a judgment set forth in Florida must be enforced in Ontario. as a
significant connection existed between the cause of action and the foreign court. The
appellants, a husband and wife with apparently little business savvy, entered into a real
estate transaction in Florida when they bought and sold vacant land. Following a dispute,
the appellants were sued in Florida in 1986, but did not personally appear, leading to a
default judgment against them. The Florida jury awarded $210,000 in monetary
damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages. Adhering to questionable legal advice from
their attorney (who advised that a foreign judgment was unenforceable in Ontario), the
appellants never requested that their judgments be set aside, or appealed; by the time of
the hearing in 1998, the value of the foreign judgment grew to CAN $800,000.00. The
Supreme Court of Canada found that a "real and substantial connection" existed between
the subject matter of the action, the jurisdiction and the defendants, which were necessary
in the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments. The Court reviewed the
"significant" ties to Florida (most notably, the disputed land), when recognizing the
judgment. The Court did hold that, even if a "real and substantial connection" existed, a
foreign judgment would not be recognized in instances of: (i) fraud, (ii) where "natural
justice" was jeopardized (e.g. the fairness of the foreign procedure and due process, but
not the merits of the case) and (iii) when public policy called for such non-recognition
(e.g. preventing enforcement of foreign judgments contrary to Canadian concepts of
justice). In Beals. the Court specifically found: (i) the absence of fraud, (ii) natural
justice was not affected, as the appellants were fully informed of the Florida proceedings
(having received both due process and notice of the financial implications if they lost the
case, even if by a default) and (iii) the finding of large monetary damages by the Florida
courts did not violate public policy.
B.

The Future of Cross-Border Cooperation

The necessity for cross-border cooperation with respect to insolvencies must
balance issues of state sovereignty, with the realization that failing to expedite and
economically handle major insolvencies has enormous financial implications. Without
international guidelines in globalized and technically advanced economies, disaster
follows. For example, in the context of an insolvency, the use of different court officials
(and guidelines) adhering to local rules (and under pressure from local creditors) would
create vastly different results, with receivables only collected in the account debtor's
jurisdiction and not released to other courts or creditors. 3 4 Without guidance.
insolvencies lead to lost opportunities, as businesses with established goodwill, if shut
down, cause the loss of valuable assets. Such a liquidation does not maximize value for
the creditors of a company, or its shareholders. If35 anything. an insolvent (but viable)
business should be explored to conserve resources.'
Despite recent Canadian decisions in Singer and Holt, which question the
future of Canadian court recognition and assistance in cross-border protocols, the tide of
U.S. resistance to recognize Canadian proceedings has turned. 36 The U.S. Bankruptcy
13. Beals v. SaIdanha. (2003) S.C.J. No. 77.

'-4 See Farley. supra note 48. at 2.
15 See id. at 3.

136The spirit of cross-border cooperation reached its lowest point in In re Toga Mfg. Ltd.. 28 B.R.
165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). In Toga. the U.S. Coun denied a Canadian bankruptcy trustee's
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Courts have assisted Canadian reorganizations involving debtors with operations and
assets in the United States, including where Canadian-based debtors with substantial
operations (and creditors) in the United States commenced reorganization proceedings
1 37
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts have frequently aided Canadian
under the CCAA.
reorganization proceedings by restraining creditors in the United States from taking
3
proceedings against the debtors' U.S. assets.1 8 The U.S. courts in these cases have
usually considered these applications to be non-controversial, and injunctions have been
based creditors from pursuing their remedies against
routinely granted to restrain U.S.39
the debtors' U.S.-based assets. 1
Despite the best efforts of the Concordat, the Model Law and the Guidelines, a
comprehensive, mature bankruptcy treaty may be an ideal for all of the NAFTA nations.
While the Model Law's statutory recognition of a foreign representative has been
beneficial to parties involved in cross-border insolvencies, the Model Law has been
' 4
described as "simply an idealistic attempt at facial coordination."' 0 Although the
Concordat has provided a firm model for U.S and Canadian cross-border insolvency
protocols, allowing efficiently customized protocols for given scenarios, while
counterbalancing universalist proceedings repugnant to Canadians and Americans, the
question remains whether courts will continue to have the time and financial resources
The internationalization of business in a climate where
for creative protocols.
insolvencies are becoming more frequent in an arguably declining international economy
poses serious issues. Courts may be hesitant to prescribe universality principles which,
as opponents would argue. undermine a state's sovereignty. Conversely, states seeking
foreign investment may resist isolationist territoriality principles, which frighten foreign
investors concerned that they face discrimination in a framework favoring domestic
creditors. In addition, U.S. courts have yet to hear a challenge to the ability of courts to
create "informal treaties" through protocols, a power which is violative of the U.S.
Constitution. Finally, commentators have challenged whether recognizing the precepts of
comity should include adopting foreign orders even remotely contradictory to domestic
laws.
The lone attempt at codifying a definitive approach to contending with U.S.Canadian cross-border insolvencies, the unratified United States of America-Canada
Bankruptcy Treaty of 1979. failed as it was viewed as a threat to sovereignty by
mandating a single proceeding in one venue and the application of one jurisdiction's law
141
It is difficult to imagine that the proposed treaty was politically
in a foreign court.

request for injunction against a U.S. creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 304, holding that it was the court's
duty to "protect United States citizens' claims against foreign judgments inconsistent with this
country's well-defined and accepted policies." See Dargan, stIIra note 7. at 107. citing to Toga.
137
See Farley. supra note 48. at 26.
'31Idat 26-27.
139
Id. Justice Farley has compiled a list of several ancillary orders which have been granted by U.S.
bankruptcy courts assisting several important Canadian reorganizations. including: Canada 3000
Inc. (Case 01-43656 (KM). C.D. Calif. November 9. 2001). Air Canada (Case No. 03-11971 (PCB).
S.D.N.Y.. April 3. 2003). lvaco Inc. (Case No. 03-65608-R. E.D. Mich., September 17. 2003). Re
CanadianAirlines International Limited (Bankr. Hawaii: March 2000). Re Euro United
Corporation (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.. January 2000). and. most recently. Sielco Ic. (Case Nos. 42401.
and 42403. E.D. Mich., January 29,2004).
42402.
140
See id. at 125.
41 See id. at 16.
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unpopular because of its underlying and basic concept: "[t]here shall be a single
administration of the estate of the debtor.' 42 Under the 1979 proposed treaty, even
ancillary proceedings in the nation where the minority of assets were held were
prohibited from using local law, meaning that U.S. and Canadian creditors may have had
to surrender their rights to a court in a foreign jurisdiction. 43 Creating a treaty which
recognizes state sovereignty and formalizes the spirit of cooperation envisioned in
successful cross-border protocols makes economic sense and will not challenge long-held
concepts of state sovereignty.

:42
4

See Toga at 170. cited in Dargan. supra note 7. at 116.
See Dargan. supra note 7. at 116.
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